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President Obama’s Approach to 
the Middle East and North 
Africa:  
Strategic Absence 
Paul Williams*  
Many commentators argue that the White House does not 
have a policy regarding the Middle East and North Africa. 
Based on observations of the White House’s foreign policy 
decisions over a breadth of seven years, this article argues that 
The White House does have a clear policy and it is one of 
Strategic Absence. The term Strategic Absence is used to 
describe political behavior that arises from a belief that 
sometimes, in foreign affairs, it is better to be absent rather 
than present. Strategic Absence has led to a degradation of 
American influence in the Middle East and has contributed to 
deteriorating conflict situations in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and 
Libya. The author describes the six core tenets of Strategic 
Absence and demonstrates, through case studies, that the 
Obama Administration has responded to challenges and threats 
to the United States’ strategic interests in Iraq, Egypt, Libya, 
Yemen and Syria according to the parameters of the doctrine of 
Strategic Absence. 
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I. Introduction  
Unfortunately, [a policy of] disengagement turns out not to 
work. A drones-first policy has stoked anti-American fervor 
from Pakistan to Yemen. Libya is on the brink of civil war. 
Syria has become “the most catastrophic humanitarian crisis 
any of us have seen in a generation,” as Mr. Obama’s U.N 
ambassador said.  
Fred Hiatt, Editor, Washington Post 1 
Think tank reports, op-eds by former senior government officials, 
and news reporting on leaks from current officials highlight the same 
theme: the degradation of American foreign policy interests in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA).2 Conflict and uncertainty 
reign across Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Turkey, fueled by 
violence, dissention, and the ever-increasing threats of ISIS, Al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the PKK. In contrast, Egypt 
currently enjoys a measure of tranquility, the price of which was the 
reversal of the Arab Spring momentum and a return to heavy-handed 
governance by an elected military regime. 
Many commentators accuse the White House of not having a 
policy vis-à-vis the Middle East and North Africa. In reality, however, 
the White House has a very clear, if not well-articulated, doctrine. 
The White House has variously described its MENA doctrine as 
“Don’t Do Stupid Stuff”, or alternatively “Leading from Behind.”3 
 
1. Fred Hiatt, Iraq Highlights for Obama the Threat of Disengagement, 
WASH. POST (June 15, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fred-hiatt-iraq-highlights-
for-obama-the-threat-of-disengagement/2014/06/15/414d2616-f311-11e3-
bf76-447a5df6411f_story.html [https://perma.cc/WS2Q-UJ8N]. 
2. See Fred Hiatt, Obama’s Syria Achievement, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-syria-
achievement/2015/09/06/961b416a-50de-11e5-8c19-
0b6825aa4a3a_story.html [https://perma.cc/DMV9-CQNX] (citing the 
Obama administration’s seeming disinterest in Syria despite the mass 
displacement of its citizens and destruction of cultural monuments); see 
also Michael Crowley, Obama’s Mideast ‘Free Fall’, POLITICO (Mar. 26, 
2015, 7:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/barack-obama-
yemen-isil-middle-east-116440 [http://perma.cc/H5WT-NG27] (citing 
the instability in North Africa and America’s withdrawal of troops from 
the Middle East). 
3. See Jim Acosta, The Obama Doctrine: Inarticulate or Disengaged?, 
CNN (Aug. 13, 2014, 8:31 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/13/politics/obama-doctrine/index.html 
[http://perma.cc/JQ27-D5RF] (“Don’t Do Stupid Stuff”); see also 
Charles Krauthammer, The Obama Doctrine: Leading From Behind, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-obama-doctrine-leading-
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From observing the White House’s foreign policy decisions over a 
breadth of seven years, the doctrine can more fully be surmised to be 
one of Strategic Absence. The term Strategic Absence is used to 
describe political behavior that arises from a belief that sometimes, in 
foreign affairs, it is better to be absent rather than present.4 
The White House’s doctrine of Strategic Absence is built around 
the following core elements: narrowing the definition of American 
strategic interests;5 avoiding the lure of human rights driven policy 
and actions;6 shifting responsibility for international conflict 
management to regional actors and international partners while 
pursuing “partnership lite”;7 limiting belief in the United States’ 
ability to positively affect change;8 minimizing U.S. military 
involvement overseas while at the same time maximizing the use of 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS);9 and generally relying upon 
 
from-behind/2011/04/28/AFBCy18E_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/XM86-YTK8]. 
4. See Aaron David Miller, Obama’s Egypt Policy Makes Perfect Sense, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/obamas-egypt-policy-makes-
perfect-sense/ [http://perma.cc/L5VA-LHB2] (demonstrating that the 
policy of strategic absence is at work in America’s support of democratic 
transitions in Egypt but not, for instance, in Saudi Arabia).   
5. See Zachary C. Shirkey, America Can’t Escape the Middle East, NAT’L 
INT. (July 29, 2013), available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/america-cant-escape-the-
middle-east-8787?page=2 [http://perma.cc/SDP7-NJ5K] (identifying 
“stable global energy markets and . . . countering security threats” as 
the primary American interests in the Middle East). 
6. See Frederic C. Hof, Obama, Open Your Eyes, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 9, 
2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/09/obama-open-your-eyes-
syria-refugees-assad-europe/ [http://perma.cc/ENS8-WLEG] (indicating 
America’s lack of human rights policies).  
7. See, e.g., Jonathan Marcus, Obama’s Five Key Middle East 
Battlegrounds in 2015, BBC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30636655 
[http://perma.cc/V2GQ-TNT3] (suggesting that the U.S. “remains 
important in forming coalitions” despite its “growing sense that the 
people of the [Middle East] must sort out their own problems.”). 
8. See David Greene, Obama on Limitations He Faces in a Complicated 
World, NPR (May 29, 2014, 5:11 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/29/316891557/obama-on-limitations-he-
faces-in-a-complicated-world [http://perma.cc/XGB5-BLSL] (assessing 
the limitations of American power in the realm of foreign relations). 
9. See Shashank Bengali & David S. Cloud, U.S. Drone Strikes Up Sharply 
in Afghanistan, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/21/world/la-fg-afghanistan-drones-
20130222 [http://perma.cc/KS9J-W7GR] (“[D]rone strikes . . . [are] on 
the rise even as American troops have pulled back from ground and air 
operations and pushed Afghan soldiers and police to the lead.”); see also 
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accommodation (some would say appeasement) as a viable basis for 
accomplishing American strategic interests.10 
II. Employing the Doctrine of Strategic Absence in 
the Middle East and North Africa 
During the past seven years, the United States has faced 
challenges to its strategic interests in Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and 
Syria. The United States also faced existential threats from the non-
state terrorist organizations of AQAP and ISIS. In each of these cases, 
the Obama Administration responded to these challenges and threats 
according to the parameters of its doctrine of Strategic Absence. 
American power can make a decisive difference, but we cannot 
do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves, nor can we take 
the place of Arab partners in securing their region. 
President Obama11  
In Iraq, the adoption of the doctrine of Strategic Absence was 
born out of President Obama’s frustration with and criticism of his 
predecessor’s policies in the Middle East, his electoral promise to 
bring American troops home, and his limited belief in America’s 
ability to influence events in Iraq.12 His application of the doctrine 
 
Jack Nicas, Why Some Drone Makers Hate the Word “Drone” and 
Want to Change It, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2014, 4:53 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-some-drone-makers-hate-the-word-
drone-and-want-to-change-it-1412821801 [http://perma.cc/DB7S-W3J7] 
(supporting the use of “unmanned aircraft systems” in place of 
“drones”). 
10. See Maxime Fischer-Zernin, The Obama Doctrine: Retrenchment and 
Accommodation, DUKE POL. REV. (Oct. 2, 2014, 1:25 AM), 
http://dukepoliticalreview.org/the-obama-doctrine-retrenchment-and-
accommodation/ [http://perma.cc/P9MZ-GBNG] (“[T]he Obama grand 
strategy is one of ‘overarching American retrenchment and 
accommodation internationally . . . .’”); see also Michael Barone, 
Obama’s Pattern of Appeasement, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/365857/obamas-pattern-
appeasement-michael-barone [http://perma.cc/KJ5N-5ME2] (suggesting 
that Obama’s “pronounced” pattern of “truckling to longtime enemies” 
reflects a foreign policy characterized by appeasement).   
11. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on ISIL (Sept. 10, 
2015, 9:01 PM) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-
president-isil-1 [https://perma.cc/3BYH-APRM]).  
12. Paul Shinkman, The Obama Doctrine: Let the Mideast Fight Its Own 
Wars, US NEWS (Apr. 2, 2015, 5:54 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/02/obamas-middle-east-
policies-leave-saudi-arabia-iran-to-fight-it-out [http://perma.cc/BH89-
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revolved around: minimizing American military engagement via the 
complete withdrawal of all American troops from Iraq;13 shifting the 
burden of securing the country to the Iraqi Army via the transfer of 
substantial advanced weaponry to the Iraqi Army; disengaging from 
Iraq’s political transition to an inclusive and pluralistic democracy;14 
and narrowing the definition of America’s interest in “democratizing” 
Iraq to “trouble-free stability” in Iraq.15  
[Leading from behind is] so at odds with the John Wayne 
expectation for what America is in the world, -- -- [b]ut it’s 
necessary for shepherding us through this phase.  
 
SWX4]; see Katie Sanders, Obama Wanted to Keep 10,000 Troops in 
Iraq, ABC’s Raddatz Claims, PUNDITFACT (Aug. 24, 2014, 4:50 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/aug/24/martha-
raddatz/obama-wanted-keep-10000-troops-iraq-abcs-raddatz-c/ 
[http://perma.cc/X6JS-8W2W] (explaining that “Obama, who won 
office in 2008 partly for his pledge to end the war in Iraq, announced his 
own [troop withdrawal] plans a month after taking office.”).   
13. Sanders, supra note 12. 
14. Felicia Schwartz & Julian Barnes, U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus to Western 
Province, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sunnis-need-more-iraqi-support-in-fighting-
islamic-state-u-s-general-says-1432149953 [http://perma.cc/U8FA-759Q]; 
see Michael R. Gordon, Plan Increases Role of G.I.’s in Iraq Training, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/world/middleeast/23training.html
?_r=0&pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/3XKU-4EYP] (describing the 
U.S. intention “to transfer more of the security burden in Iraq to the 
Iraqis . . . .”); see also Shadi Hamid & Peter Mandaville, The U.S. Is 
Giving Up on Middle East Democracy—and That’s a Mistake, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2014) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/the-us-is-
giving-up-on-middle-east-democracy-and-thats-a-mistake/282890/ 
[http://perma.cc/9J6E-FUE3] (explaining “That the U.S. is 
fundamentally limited in its ability to influence the internal politics of 
the Arab states has been a constant theme with the Obama 
administration . . .”).  
15. See Hamid & Mandaville, supra note 14 (asserting that Obama has “de-
prioritized democracy assistance” in the Middle East); Ben Hubbard, 
Robert Worth, & Michael Gordon, Power Vacuum in Middle East Lifts 
Militants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/world/middleeast/power-vacuum-
in-middle-east-lifts-militants.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/W9A9-N8BF] 
(discussing Anthony Blinken’s statement that Iraq seemed “‘more 
democratic’ . . . than ‘any time in recent history’”); see also President 
Barack Obama, supra note 11. 
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An adviser to President Obama16 
In Libya, the Obama Administration coined the phrase “leading 
from behind” to describe its approach to protecting American 
strategic interests. This approach encompassed: narrowing the 
definition of American strategic interests to neutralizing Col. 
Qaddafi’s ability to kill civilians seeking to topple his regime;17 
partnership and burden sharing through the utilization of multilateral 
political and security institutions such as the United Nations Security 
Council, NATO, and the International Criminal Court;18 and 
minimizing American military engagement by refusing to commit any 
troops to fight the Gaddafi regime19 while emphasizing the limited 
nature of U.S. airstrikes throughout the campaign.  
This latter point is illustrated by a congressional briefing provided 
in late June 2011.20 From April to June, 2011, the U.S. conducted 
about 60 airstrikes and 30 drone strikes.21 In the report to Congress, 
administration officials argued that those strikes were defensive 
actions simply meant to protect aircraft.22 They made the case that 
the U.S. was not engaged in hostilities and instead played a “non-
kinetic” role in the conflict, simply offering services such as refueling 
and surveillance to our regional partners.23 As reported by the New 
York Times, the entire tone of the report was one in which the 
Obama administration took great pains to emphasize that the U.S. 
 
16. Ryan Lizza, The Consequentialist, NEW YORKER (May 2, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist 
[http://perma.cc/9DFC-SVCG]. 
17. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to 
the Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-
president-address-nation-libya [https://perma.cc/BQ7X-CUFD]) 
(summarizing the efforts to stabilize Benghazi). 
18. See Dan Bilefsky & Mark Landler, As U.N. Backs Military Action in 
Libya, U.S. Role is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18nations.html?page
wanted=all [http://perma.cc/RH5C-5965]. 
19. Paul Harris, Robert Gates: No US ‘Boots on Ground’ in Libya, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2011, 3:12 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/31/gates-rules-out-
american-troops-libya [http://perma.cc/XE9Q-ANM7]. 
20. WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA 1 (2011).  
21. Charles Savage & Thom Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in Libya 
Followed Handoff to NATO, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/world/africa/21powers.html?_r=
0 [http://perma.cc/CN67-E3L4l]. 
22. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 20, at 9. 
23. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 20, at 25.  
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was not playing a leadership role in the region and, instead, ceded 
control to other players in the conflict.24 
The doctrine of Strategic Absence continued into the post-conflict 
phase where the Obama administration was categorical about not 
engaging in peacekeeping or substantial efforts at nation building, 
leaving the work largely to the UN and emerging local democratic 
entities.25  
If there’s one lesson this administration has learned, from 
President Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech through the Arab Spring, 
it’s that when it comes to this region, nothing happens in a 
linear way — and precious little is actually about us, which is a 
hard reality to accept.  
Senior State Department Official26 
In Egypt, previous Administrations had always shown 
considerable deference to President Mubarak despite his human rights 
record.27 This approach of avoiding the lure of human rights driven 
policy and actions, coupled with limited belief in America’s ability to 
promote meaningful change formed the core of the Obama 
Administration’s approach to Egypt as it progressed through various 
phases of the Arab Spring. President Obama’s speech at Cairo 
University was a watershed moment in the minimization of a human 
rights narrative in the American-Egyptian relationship, going further 
than his predecessors in its avoidance of nearly any mention of human 
rights.28 The subsequent embrace of President Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood regime, followed by a similar embrace of General Sisi 
 
24. See Charles Savage & Thom Shanker, supra note 21 (stating that “the 
United States’ role had not risen to the level of ‘hostilities,’ at least 
since it handed control of the mission over to NATO.”); see also WHITE 
HOUSE, supra note 20.  
25. Dominic Tierney, The Backlash Against Nation-Building, 5 PRISM 13, 
15 (2014). 
26. Crowley, supra note 2. 
27. Obama Says Egypt’s Transition ‘Must Begin Now’, CNN (Feb. 2, 2011, 
8:51 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/01/us.egypt.obama/ 
[http://perma.cc/X3WS-V59G]. 
28. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Cairo 
University (June 4, 2009, 1:10 PM) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-
university-6-04-09 [https://perma.cc/5PN6-TW4D]) (emphasizing 
humanitarian notions but failing to mention or criticize Egypt’s record 
of human rights abuses.). 
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and his military-centric regime, also followed this pattern of avoiding 
the lure of a human rights driven policy.29 
Notably, the Obama Administration briefly tried to influence the 
behavior of the Sisi regime by suspending nearly $500 million in 
military sales, but rather quickly abandoned this approach under the 
belief illustrated by the quote above that America had little to no 
ability to affect change in Egypt.30  
[I]f a JV team puts on Lakers uniforms, that doesn’t make them 
Kobe Bryant. I think there is a distinction between the capacity 
and reach of a bin Laden and a network that is actively 
planning major terrorist plots against the homeland versus 
jihadists who are engaged in various local power struggles and 
disputes, often sectarian.  
President Obama31 
In the case of ISIS, the Obama Administration laid the foundation 
for Strategic Absence by narrowly defining American strategic interest 
to exclude threats by local jihadi power struggles. The Administration 
also dramatically understated the threat posed by ISIS to the United 
States, placing it outside the narrowly defined sphere of American 
strategic interests. As it became necessary to utilize force to confront 
ISIS and prevent the collapse of Iraq, the Obama Administration 
relied on a partnership with the Iraqi Army, pro-Iranian militias, 
Syrian opposition forces, and our more traditional Kurdish allies.32 For 
the air campaign, the Obama Administration assembled an effective 
coalition of European and Arab states.33  
 
29. Spencer Case, How Obama Sided with the Muslim Brotherhood, NAT’L 
REV. (July 3, 2014, 3:52 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/381947/how-obama-sided-
muslim-brotherhood-spencer-case [http://perma.cc/CXQ9-XBUA]. 
30. Carlo Munoz, US Suspends Military Sales, Aid to Egypt, HILL (Oct. 9, 
2013, 10:28 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/327635-us-suspends-
military-sales-aid-to-egypt [http://perma.cc/587X-GFGL]. 
31. Glenn Kessler, Spinning Obama’s reference to Islamic State as a ‘JV’ 
team, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-
checker/wp/2014/09/03/spinning-obamas-reference-to-isis-as-a-jv-team/ 
[https://perma.cc/J7TQ-W5ZK]. 
32. Loveday Morris, Pro-Iran Militias Take Upper Hand After U.S.-backed 
Forces Crumble in Anbar, WASH. POST (May 30, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/pro-iran-militias-
take-upper-hand-after-us-backed-forces-crumble-in-
anbar/2015/05/30/22a3894a-03b8-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/M7QU-WAE5]. 
33. See Tom Bowman, Despite Coalition Partners, U.S. Has Done Most 
Airstrikes Against ISIS, NPR (Feb. 6, 2015, 4:09 PM), available at 
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In the case of the Kurdish forces and the Syrian opposition forces, 
the approach was one of “partnership lite” in that the Americans 
resisted requests by the Kurdish forces to provide advanced weaponry, 
instead directing the weapons through Baghdad and the same military 
infrastructure that initially abandoned hundreds of advanced weapons 
systems to ISIS.34 With the Syrian opposition, the Americans 
conditioned assistance on a commitment by its rebel allies to only 
attack ISIS and not the Syrian government forces that were 
responsible for the vast majority of attacks against Syrian civilians.35 
As a result of this “partnership lite,” only a few dozen Syrian rebel 
forces deployed inside Syria, and they were quickly defeated and 
scattered.36  
When it became necessary to deploy American ground forces into 
Iraq in September 2014, President Obama was explicit about their 
limited role as catalysts for shifting the burden to our Iraqi partners.37 
In a prepared statement, the White House declared, “[t]hese 
American forces will not have a combat mission—we will not get 
dragged into another ground war in Iraq. But they are needed to 
support Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and 
equipment. We’ll also support Iraq’s efforts to stand up National 
Guard Units to help Sunni communities secure their own freedom 
from ISIL’s control.”38 
The truth is, you can dwell on Yemen, or you can recognize 
that we’re one agreement away from a game-changing, legacy-
setting nuclear accord on Iran that tackles what every one 
agrees is the biggest threat to the region. 
Senior White House Official39 
 
http://www.npr.org/2015/02/06/384345873/despite-coalition-partners-
u-s-has-done-most-airstrikes-against-isis [http://perma.cc/D83P-7QFY] 
(explaining that “[i]nside Syria, the United States and its partners have 
been conducting airstrikes since September.”). 
34. Yaroslav Trofimov, Kurdish Peshmerga Say They Need Weapons After 
ISIS Seizes Iraqi Arsenal, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2015, 7:06 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/kurdish-peshmerga-say-they-need-
weapons-after-isis-seizes-iraqi-arsenal-1433415999/ 
[http://perma.cc/TE79-HJQB]. 
35. Paul  Shinkman, Obama’s ‘New’ Plan for Syria, US NEWS (Oct. 9, 2015, 
2:43 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/09/us-ends-
failed-syrian-training-program-starts-arming-rebels-directly 
[http://perma.cc/NCS7-68P8]. 
36. Id.  
37. President Barack Obama, supra note 11. 
38. President Barack Obama, supra note 11. 
39. Crowley, supra note 2. 
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The Obama Administration placed Yemen outside the sphere of 
American strategic interests, as the crisis coincided with the zenith of 
the Iranian negotiations.40 The Administration also deferred 
extensively to our Saudi, Qatari, Emirati, and Egyptian allies on how 
to conduct the campaign,41 which many believe is a Saudi-Iranian 
proxy war, and has refused to be drawn into the conflict by the lure 
of human rights.  
So committed is the Obama Administration to the perception of 
disengagement that it makes frequent calls for the parties to the 
Yemen crisis to cease hostilities, ignoring the fact that the United 
States is actually one fo the parties, through its provision of the vast 
bulk of the weapons being used by the Saudi led coalition, as well as 
massive intelligence and logistics support, including aerial refueling for 
nearly all the missions.42 Notably, some commentators assert the 
Administration has failed to reign in the Saudi-led coalition in order 
to appease the Arab states in the middle of the Iran deal negotiations.   
[I]t’s undeniable that Syria today is the sum total of unattended 
consequences of a policy that has tried to hold it at arm’s 
length, tried to commit humanitarian resources, but in an 
attempt to stand back from the situation has unintentionally, 
inadvertently contributed to a crisis that is now out of control. 
Ambassador Frederic Hof, Adviser on Syria to 
Secretary Clinton43 
In the case of Syria, it initially appeared that the Obama 
Administration had abandoned the doctrine of Strategic Absence. 
President Obama both called for the ouster of President Assad44 and 
 
40. See Guy Taylor & Tom Howell Jr., Yemen Coup Shows Obama Lacks 
Middle East Terror Strategy, Critics Say, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/25/yemen-coup-
shows-obama-lacks-middle-east-terror-st/?page=all 
[http://perma.cc/S73Z-3VPS] (outlining Yemen’s importance in light of 
evolving US-Iran relationship). 
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declared that the use of chemical weapons would be met with the use 
of force by the United States.45 
With respect to calling for the ouster of President Assad, 
McClatchy News later revealed that the declaration of “Assad must 
go” was an effort by President Obama and his team to put themselves 
on the right side of history by declaring something he thought would 
happen soon anyway, without any intervention or effort from the 
United States.46 Indeed, the United States was so convinced that 
Assad was on his way out that the Administration rejected a 2012 
proposal by Russia that planned for Assad to cede power after peace 
talks had begun.47  
The chemical red lines turned out to be an empty assertion. Since 
the red line was established, the Syrian Regime has used chemical 
weapons numerous times.48 Russia did manage to broker a deal 
whereby Syria turned over the bulk of its chemical weapons stockpile 
for destruction, but to date there continue to be reports of the use of 
chlorine gas and other possible chemical agents.49 Most commentators 
note that President Obama’s efforts to enforce the red line evaporated 
when the British Parliament refused to endorse the use of force to 
prevent the use of chemical weapons.50 Without the British in play, 
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http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-
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russian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside 
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President Obama would not be able to follow the same game plan as 
he had in Libya, with initial American leadership followed by a shift 
to leading from behind the British and French. On the eve of 
enforcing the red line, he unexpectedly turned to Congress for their 
permission; something he knew would not be forthcoming.51 
The Obama Administration also deferred to its regional partners, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and shifted the burden of equipping and 
arming the rebel forces fighting against the Assad regime to them. 
Unfortunately, without American leadership and oversight these two 
allies readily armed numerous factions that turned out to be highly 
extreme. While eventually undertaking a program of arming and 
training, the Obama Administration has been steadfast in both its 
assertion that America can in fact do little to influence what is 
happening in Syria, and that America will not use military force in 
Syria, no matter how extreme the humanitarian situation may 
become.     
Furthermore, the Administration’s strategy to stay at arm’s 
length from the conflict in Syria is evidenced by the White House’s 
response to Russia’s involvement in the conflict. While the White 
House tried to convince partners not to allow Russia to use their 
airspace to fly arms to Assad, the U.S. did not take a strong position 
when Iraq allowed Russia to use its airspace, even at a time when 
Iraq was relying on American air support for its very existence.52 And 
now that Russia is using its newly established airbase in Syria to 
attack the rebel forces trained by the United States, the Obama 
Administration has launched a narrative of potential cooperation with 
Russia.  
The durability of the doctrine of Strategic Absence may be 
attributed to the fact that at first there was reason to believe that the 
strategy worked. Iraq was doing relatively fine. The Gaddafi regime 
was destroyed in Libya and the country seemed to be headed to the 
right direction. The Arab Spring was in full swing, and Egypt was 
being released from the grip of Hosni Mubarak. However, while the 
policy may have seemed successful at first, its shortfalls and failures 
are now clear. 
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III. The Consequences of America’s Strategic Absence 
in the Middle East and North Africa 
The policy of Strategic Absence has not yielded the sought-after 
stability and protection of American interests. Instead, its 
consequences are far-reaching and destabilizing.53  
We’re in a goddamn free fall here. 
James Jeffrey, President Obama’s former Ambassador to Iraq54 
Iraq is less stable to than it was ten years ago.55 The Iraqi security 
forces have nearly crumbled in the face of attacks by ISIS. ISIS has 
captured substantial amounts of highly advanced American weaponry 
transferred from departing U.S. forces to the Iraqi army. It is the 
most well-financed terrorist organization in the world, with an 
estimated $2 billion in assets.56 ISIS controls two major and 
strategically important cities. It, and other forces like it, has attracted 
more than 25,000 foreign fighters since 2011.57 What remains of the 
backbone of the Iraqi military effort is primarily composed of Shiite 
militias.58 Americans have put troops back on the ground in a combat 
environment,59 and have been conducting around the clock airstrikes 
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since March of 2015.60 The political structure of Iraq seems to be on 
the verge of sectarian political deadlock, and it appears as if whatever 
political gains were made over the last ten years may be in danger of 
erosion.61  
[Our] policy of disengaging [in the Middle East] has contributed 
to the rise [of extremism].  
Ret. Gen. John Keane, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army62 
Libya is an ungoverned country in a three-way civil war. 
Following Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, a burst of militias formed in the 
country.63 Many of these militias have subsequently disbanded, but 
the remaining ones, state-affiliated and otherwise, continue to foster 
destabilization.64 In addition, terrorist groups Al Qaeda and ISIS are 
active in Libya. With Libya in possession of thirty-eight percent of 
Africa’s oil (48 billion barrels), whichever force gains ultimate control 
of Libya will have access to extremely valuable natural resources.65 
Should the future government use this wealth for destruction, Libya’s 
proximity to Europe will be of major concern. Other Libyan neighbors 
have begun to take note of the country’s greenhouse of instability.66 In 
the wake of Islamic extremist shooting sprees in Tunisia, Tunisia’s 
prime minister announced plans to build a 100-mile wall along its 
border with Libya to protect Tunisia from Libyan terrorists.67 
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Yemen has become the battlefield in a proxy war between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia that includes forces from the United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, and Egypt.68 Reports indicate that “there are over one million 
internally displaced people in Yemen . . . approximately 250,000 
refugees and an estimated 21 million people in need [of humanitarian 
assistance].”69 
Saudi airstrikes have caused significant civilian casualties, 
impeded the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver aid, and 
crippled what was left of the country’s infrastructure.70 The Saudi-led 
coalition enacted a blockade, resulting in shortages of much needed 
supplies for civilians.71 Rupert Colville, a spokesman for the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, blamed the Saudi-led, 
and American-supported, coalition for the “naval blockade of Yemen’s 
main seaports,” highlighting that it is exacerbating the humanitarian 
crisis in Yemen that has left four out of five civilians in need.72  
From late March to late September, 2015, over 2,355 civilians 
were killed.73 There are increasing calls from the international 
community to make peace, in part because Yemen is a hotspot of 
activity for AQAP. Before the war in Yemen, AQAP was designated 
as the highest Al-Qaeda threat to the United States.74 The 
destabilized conditions created by the war have created fertile 
conditions for the continued operation and growth of AQAP.  
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Egypt has gone back to the future. Many commentators note that 
the current government is more oppressive than the pre-Arab Spring 
Mubarak government.75 Freedom of the press has disintegrated as 
more and more journalists are jailed or fined by the Egyptian 
government.76 For example, Human Rights Watch asserted that the 
new Egyptian anti-terror law enacted in August, 2015 by President 
Sisi is so broad as to curtail fundamental freedoms.77 Further, 
President Obama’s reversal of the 2013 arms ban in March of 2015 is 
concerning given the poor training of Egyptian forces, as exemplified 
in the September 2015 killings of a dozen people who were traveling 
from a picnic in the desert.78  
This may be the most surprising of President Obama’s foreign-
policy legacies: not just that he presided over a humanitarian 
and cultural disaster of epochal proportions, but that he soothed 
the American people into feeling no responsibility for the 
tragedy. 
Fred Hiatt79 
Syria is in crisis. In the wake of the civil war, four million refugees 
have fled the country, fueling Europe’s largest refugee flux since 
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WWII.80 There are over eleven million internally displaced Syrians. 
Over 200,000 civilians have been killed.81 ISIS occupies large swathes 
of the country.82 Al-Qaeda, in the form of Al-Nusra, controls another 
large part of the country.83 The Syrian government is dropping barrel 
bombs on the population.84 Hezbollah is deployed and operating in 
Syria under the government’s request.85 Nearly three years after 
Obama declared that President Assad must go, Assad’s position is as 
strong as it ever was. 
A debilitated armed opposition movement fights against Assad, 
but has suffered attack by Russia, an ally of the current president.86 
Russia now has planes installed at Syria’s Latakia air base.87 Yet the  
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super power, as demonstrated in its attack of opposition forces instead 
of ISIS,88 has unclear intentions toward the terrorist organization.89 As 
French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius opined, “The international 
coalition is striking [ISIS], France is striking [ISIS], Mr. Bashar al-
Assad only a little bit, and for the moment, the Russians not at all.”90 
Not only is Russia not attacking ISIS, it is blatantly attacking U.S. 
allies in Syria,91 thus undermining American strategic position in the 
region.  
Former Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford retired from his post in 
February 2015 due to frustrations with the ineffectiveness of Obama’s 
approach in the country.92 He is open about the failure of the Obama 
policy to aid the country: “There really is nothing we can point to 
that’s been very successful in our policy except the removal of about 
ninety-three percent of some of Assad’s chemical materials. But now 
he’s using chlorine gas against his opponents.”93 Ford further stated 
his concerns regarding the threats posed by the Syrian crisis: “It is 
not a conflict that we should ignore, either on moral or on national 
security grounds, given the extremist threat to us and our friends.”94  
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Ambassador and former Obama Administration official Fred Hof also 
recently expounded on the failures of the President’s policy, stating 
that “the dead children washing up on Turkey’s shores are a direct 
result of the Obama administration’s failure to stop Bashar al-Assad’s 
killing machine.”95  
The policy of Strategic Absence has also threatened to destabilize 
important American allies. Commentators assert that Jordan’s and 
Lebanon’s stability are under extreme threat because of the strain 
caused by the influx of refugees.96 In addition, the relationship 
between the U.S. and long-term ally Israel appears to be at an 
extreme low.97 
IV. Conclusion 
For the past seven years, the U.S. has followed a coherent, clear 
strategy in the Middle East and North Africa. This doctrine, Strategic 
Absence, has been characterized by a decline in U.S. military 
commitments, shifting of the strategic lead to partners and regional 
actors, a narrowed view of national interest and the change the 
United States can make in the world, avoiding the lure of human 
rights considerations, and accommodating other international actors. 
However, the situation in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Egypt 
demonstrates the detrimental effect this policy has had on the region, 
with humanitarian crises escalating in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and an 
authoritarian military regime retaking power in Egypt. At the same 
time, the U.S. refuses to accept even partial responsibility for the 
situation, causing other international actors to take on an even larger 
role in international conflict management, even when they often 
played an instigating role in the conflict in the first place. In order to 
stabilize the Middle East and to bring peace to the region, the Obama 
administration, or its successor, will have to reverse course, and 
abandon the doctrine of strategic absence.  
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